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ABSTRACT 
The authors study the interdependent diffusion of an open source software (OSS) platform and 
its software complements. They quantify the role of OSS governance, quality signals such as 
product ratings, observational learning, and user actions upon adoption. To do so they extend the 
Bass Diffusion Model and apply it to a unique data set of 6 years of daily downloads of the 
Firefox browser and 52 of its add-ons. The study then re-casts the resulting differential equations 
into non-linear, discrete-time, state space forms; and estimate them using an MCMC approach to 
the Extended Kalman Filtern (EKF-MCMC). Unlike continuous-time filters, the EKF-MCMC 
approach avoids numerical integration, and so is more computational efficient, given the length 
of our time-series, high dimension of our state space and need to model heterogeneity. Results 
show, for example, that observational learning and add-on ratings increase the demand for 
Firefox add-ons; add-ons can increase the market potential of the Firefox platform; a slow add-
on review process can diminish platform success; and OSS platforms (i.e. Chrome and Firefox) 
compete rather than complement each other.   
 
Keywords: diffusion of digital goods; platform; complementary products;  observational learning; 
experience goods; product generations; churn; platform competition; Extended Kalman filter; Markov 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
Software platforms are ubiquitous in markets for digital goods; famous examples are the 
Linux and Windows operating systems; and Firefox and Internet Explorer browsers. Here distinct 
participants contribute to innovation: platform owners who control access to platform services; 
and communities of third-party developers and end-users who create complementary software 
and generate online feedback. Platforms can be proprietary (Explorer) or “open-source” 
(Firefox); in the latter case the software is to be freely used, altered, and shared in agreement 
with specific licenses; and owners place fewer restrictions on who can participate in platform 
innovation (Eisenmann et al. 2009). As a novel approach to innovation (Lerner and Tirole 2002), 
open source software (OSS) stands as an important research topic (von Krogh and von Hippel 
2006) in many disciplines. Yet empirical work has largely focused on factors that lead to OSS 
project success (e.g., time-to-launch) (Grewal et al. 2006; Stewart et al. 2006; Mallapragada et al. 
2012), and less on the forces that account for OSS diffusion over time, among end-users. 
Moreover, diffusion studies in marketing have focused on proprietary platforms, where the 
central question is often how price and other marketing events (Shankar and Bayus 2003) 
moderate network externalities. What, however, accounts for the joint diffusion of an open 
platform and its complements, indeed software diffusion in the absence of  pricing or other 
marketing incentives? 
In this study, we draw upon the literature on OSS development, diffusion of innovation, 
and online user-generated content to address this our overall question. For example, owners of 
closed platforms typically employ strict internal review processes to screen complementary 
software for quality and user relevance (Evans et al. 2006); in contrast, in an open platform 
system (e.g., Linux, Apache) with limited central controls, end-user online feedback 
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(Chintagunta et al. 2010) becomes one means through which potential adopters identify high-
value (relevant) complements1. Similarly, successful open platform innovation will likely depend 
on the platform’s ability to attract and retain third-party developers (Shah 2006); those who 
implement new complement features, fix bugs, and so on; which in turn could attract adopters to 
the platform (Gupta et al. 1999). Moreover, it is often these developers themselves who review 
software; and manage communication among peers (e.g., peer review process) and end-users. 
Thus, we draw on literature to consider how OSS self-governance may influence platform 
adoption over time. Finally, Raymond (1999) suggests that OSS projects should “release early, 
and release often” to produce higher quality software. Releasing a product early may attract 
developers, and gain early end-user feedback (Lakhani and Von Hippel 2003), which could then 
facilitate diffusion.  
Thus, guided by the above issues and others to be outlined later, we consider the 
following research questions: To what extent do open complementary products influence 
platform adoption? What are effects of quality signals such as product ratings, observational 
learning, and user actions on the adoption of complementary software (plug-ins, add-ons, or 
complements)? How would the release strategy of an open platform and that of its complement 
jointly affect their diffusion? What is the effect of the complement’s governing process on 
platform diffusion? Given our OSS platform context, we also control for the relative importance 
of licenses, developer rewards, and platform competition on diffusion.   
To address these questions we extend the Bass diffusion model (hereafter BDM) to study 
the joint diffusion of an open digital platform and its complements, given BDM’s parsimony, 
performance, and  the intuitive interpretations of its parameters (Hauser et al. 2006). We apply 
                                                          
1 Both open and closed platforms help maintain software quality control via APIs and SDKs (Noori and Weis 2013). 
But open platforms often accept complements that are only relevant for only a small proportion of their installed 
bases. 
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the extended model to a canonical example, the diffusion of the Mozilla Firefox browser and its 
add-ons, an OSS (See Figure 1) project initiated in 1998 in response to Netscape’s decision to 
publish its browser’s source code. Our resulting response model is dynamic, nonlinear, and 
heterogeneous; thus for estimation, we re-cast BDM differential equations into non-linear, 
discrete-time, state-space forms; and then estimate them using an MCMC approach to the 
Extended Kalman Filter (EKF), a Sequential Monte Carlo method that works with normal-linear 
approximations. Our EKF-MCMC alogorithm is preferred to other Gaussian filters such as the 
Unscented Kalman Filter (UKF) and  the Augmented Kalman Filter with continuous state space 
and discrete observations (AKF-CD) (e.g., Xie et al. 1997; Mahajan et al. 2000), given the 
lengths of our sample (T=1686 periods), the dimension of our state-space, and the importance of 
heterogeneity. Recall, the AKF-CD is continuous-time filter whose estimation requires a 
numerical integration at every period, and so it does not scale well to longer time series and/or 
high-dimensional problems, typically found in digital market studies. Moreover, the AKF-CD is 
a numerical procedure and so estimating heterogeneity is not trivial, as it is in iterative, sample 
based approaches (e.g., MCMC). Now unlike the EKF which approximates non-linear functions, 
the UKF instead approximates the posteriors of the state variables by sets of sample points 
(Ristic et al. 2004); and for highly nonlinear Gaussian systems the UKF produces typically better 
results; but our diffusion model is quadratic and so here EKF, performs just as well and is more 
computationally efficient.  
The paper, thus, contributes to an emerging empirical literature on the diffusion of open 
source innovation. First, it introduces a dynamic model to investigate several factors that could 
affect the diffusion of an open 2-sided platform, using Mozilla as an example. Although other 
empirical studies in marketing have considered features of platform innovation, namely indirect 
5 
 
network effects (e.g., Gupta et al. 1999; Basu et al. 2003), to the best of our knowledge, none has 
addressed features unique to the heterogeneous and interdependent diffusion of an open software 
platform system. Second, the paper examines the influence of a quick release strategy, a central 
but rarely tested assumption in OSS innovations (von Krogh and von Hippel 2006). Three, it 
examines the role of online, user-generated feedback on the diffusion of open innovation. 
Ironically, user generated content is central to the diffusion of an open platform; since the 
development of complementary software and the self-governing process enveloping it, generate 
free content that in turn could drive diffusion  (Hauser et al. 2006). Finally, we extend the basic 
BDM to an interdependent system; and for its estimation, we innovate to design a Bayesian 
approach to the Extended Kalman Filter (EKF-MCMC). Our specification allows diffusion to be 
latent, random processes; which in turn give us the flexibility to model adoption patterns beyond 
the simple s-shaped ones underlying the mixed effects, or basic diffusion model  (Goswami 
2001). Similarly, we link diffusion parameters to online ratings and observational learning that 
varies across product and time; in this way we account for adoption heterogeneity (Dellarocas et 
al. 2007). Lastly, we endogenize the market potential of the complements and control for the 
likely dis-adoption of free software. Our results show, that observational learning and add-on 
ratings increase the demand for Firefox add-ons; add-ons can increase the market potential of the 
Firefox platform; a slow add-on review process can diminish platform success; and OSS 
platforms (i.e. Chrome and Firefox) compete rather than complement each other.   
The main data for this study is a sample of 52 popular Firefox add-ons, free software that 
complement the Mozilla Firefox web browser. On the end-user side of this 2-sided platform, we 
collected daily reviews, user base sizes, and number of downloads for a six-year period, 2008 to 
2013.  For each add-on, we obtained its number of daily users, user ratings, and features of the 
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add-on and its developer such as license types and modes of compensation for developers. 
Finally, for the platform, we collected data on the daily number of users of Firefox, and its main 
competitors, Google’s Chrome and Microsoft’s Internet Explorer. Though public data on daily 
platform use are unavailable, we were able to estimate them from other sources, including 
market share, and public internet global statistics.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the conceptual 
background and main hypothesis of the study. Section 3 develops the theoretical model. Section 
4 presents details of the econometric model. Subsequently, section 5 presents the results of the 
estimation; and the implications of these results for open innovation. The paper concludes with 
an overview of the findings, managerial implications and limitations of the study.  
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
What then are the salient features of an OSS platform and its complements for our study? 
First, an OSS platform is a type of distributed innovation in which a platform owner invites 
third-party collaborators to develop complements (add-ons) that extend the capabilities of the 
platform (Sawhney et al. 2000; Kogut and Metiu 2001; Boudreau 2010). Studies report that 
collaborators (typically internet-based software developers and end-users) have two types of 
motives to participate in OSS projects: intrinsic motives, which include joy, altruism, and 
autonomy; and extrinsic motives, which include money, skill, and reputation (Bitzer et al. 2007; 
Franck and Jungwirth 2003). Moreover, the software they create remain public goods (von 
Krogh and von Hippel 2006), available online via distinct licenses, which govern software use 
and distribution. Thus, unlike that of proprietary platforms (Rochet and Tirole 2004, 2006; 
Parker and Van Alstyne 2005; Economides and Katsamakas 2006), the diffusion of OSS 
platforms arise largely from factors unrelated to price; but more likely related to OSS 
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developer/end-user participation, interaction and OSS project governance (von Krogh and von 
Hippel 2006).   
Thus OSS projects are managed (or governed) in ways that encourage voluntary 
participation; that is, the process of creating software aims to be open and transparent, 
decentralized and democratic (Shah 2006; O’Mahony and Ferraro 2007; O’Mahoney 2007; 
Markus 2007). Yet for open platform owners, software governance is a delicate balance between 
the ideals of democratic participation (poetry) and the practical task of creating good software 
(pragmatism) (Bahrami 2013; Rao et al. 2009; Krishnamurthy 2005). For example, to publish an 
OSS complement, a developer is often required to submit code to a review committee 
(O'Mahony and Ferraro 2007) of peer developers (Wang et al. 2012; Frey 2003). To make the 
process appear democratic, however, some platforms discourage the committee from evaluating 
software based upon its market usefulness, leaving that judgment to other developers and users. 
Similarly, OSS platforms use various forms of licenses and tools that are consistent with OS 
ideals but preserve some financial incentives for developers (Subramanian 2009, Nair et al. 2004, 
Katz and Shapiro 1994). These licenses thus may range from the very restrictive, such as General 
Public License (GPL), to less restrictive, such as Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD). BSD 
licenses allow agents to use OSS software without paying royalty on a product sold for profit, 
encouraging some profit motive among its community members. Alternatively, platform owners 
may allow its developers to solicit financial support from the end-users, or advertise a 
developer’s online profile. 
Platform owners also recognize that while democratic governance can encourage 
participation, it can also create chaos, arising from the numerous community feedbacks and 
project requests; a catalyst for this being the speed with which information moves over the 
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internet (Feller and Fitzgerald 2000). To manage chaos, OSS developers often use a quick 
release system (Sharma et al. 2002), as opposed to the slow, cautious approach adopted for 
proprietary software. As a result, a platform may release an OSS complement version that 
performs only core but lacks secondary features or final aesthetics; then leverage the expertise of 
its community to remove bugs, improve product quality, and satisfy user requests. (See Figure 1 
for Mozilla’s community structure). Raymond 1999 calls this the “release early, release often” 
approach to software development, a central tenet of OSS that, as we note before, has been rarely 
tested empirically (Chen et al. 2013). Bughin et al. (2008) calls such a community interaction 
“co-creation,” as often the same members create and use the software. Co-creation could 
facilitate the diffusion of an OSS platform, because it may speed creation of complements, which 
helps platforms compete and promote indirect network externality (Lerner and Tirole 2002).  
      -- Insert Figure 1 here -- 
Of course, the success of an OSS platform may not depend only on the software it 
creates, but also on the active use of its complements and the tasks the platform undertakes on 
behalf of its users-developers, such as responding to support requests, and writing reviews 
(Lerner and Tirole 2002). These activities studies suggest can build a platform’s social capital, 
which in turn can determine a platform’s diffusion (Roberts et al. 2006), where here measures of 
social capital include its numbers of adopters, its complements’ online user ratings, and its daily 
user counts (Moe and Trusov 2011, Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006). Online rating valence and 
dispersion then act as the community’s WOM, while the daily user counts could act as 
observational learning signals; both surrogate measures of direct network effects (Lakhani and 
Von Hippel 2003). Notable, meta-analysis confirms that market competition can moderate 
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(direct and indirect) network externality on OSS platform adoption (Subramanian 2009, Nair et 
al. 2004, Katz and Shapiro 1994, Banaccorsi and Rossi 2003). 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Given the above background, we can now suggest the following factors, and propose how 
they may moderate the diffusion of an OSS platform and its free complements: i) the platform’s 
competitors; ii) the add-on review process; iii) network externality of complements; iv) frequent 
releases of the platform and its complements; and v) online ratings and usage count signals.  
OSS Platform Competition 
    A key distinction between OSS and proprietary platforms is the absence of a pricing 
mechanism in the former (e.g. Katz and Shapiro 1985, 1994; Shapiro and Varian 2013). Thus 
because OSS is free we may be inclined to think that users would adopt multiple platforms (e.g., 
Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox); for each platform might have unique features and these are 
freely available (Cai et al. 2008). Consumer search theory suggests, however, that consumers 
may face cognitive if not monetary costs when adopting new products (Johnson et al. 2003); and 
we expect learning costs to be high for software. Moreover, downloading and using multiple 
platforms (e.g., web browsers) at the same time might diminish the quality of the end-user’s 
experience with each platform because of the greater demand for memory and CPU. Thus, we 
should observe substitution rather than complementary patterns not only among proprietary 
platforms, but also among open platforms (Rochet and Tirole2003). Therefore we predict:  
Hypothesis 1 (H1): As the number of end-users of an OSS (or proprietary) platform 
increases, the number of end-users of its peer OSS platform decreases. 
OSS Review Committee Governance 
OSS project governance is a key predictor of platform success (O’Mahony and Ferraro 
2007; O’Mahony 2007). Mozilla’s governance system is similar to that described above; that is, 
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it also combines poetry and pragmatism2; poetry being Firefox’s democratic, loose project 
governance; and pragmatism being the process through which Mozilla manages users and 
developers. For example, Mozilla uses a review committee of peer-developers (i.e., the Add-on 
Mozilla Organization or AMO) to evaluate the quality of code submitted, and to recommend 
which software Mozilla should be accept unto its platform. Presumably, a more proactive review 
committee should facilitate platform diffusion. Quick reviews and acceptance of quality software 
and rapid response to developers should foster greater community participation; and OSS 
developers are likely to generate greater positive WOM for projects when the review committee 
is actively contributing. In addition, faster acceptance of a software complement unto the 
platform would be an extrinsic and/or extrinsic reward for developers (Bitzer et al. 2007), which 
in turn may attract more developers to the platform. As a result, we predict:   
Hypothesis 2 (H2): As the contributions of the OSS review committee increase, the 
number of adopters of an OSS platform increases. 
Network Externalities 
A large installed base of platform users not only influences others to adopt the platform, 
it also attracts more third-party developers, who in turn may increase the number and diversity of 
complementary items, which then attract more adopters to the platform. What are some ways 
through which complementary items (i.e., add-ons) boost platform adoption? First, add-ons 
provide potential adopters with information that enables them to learn more about the features 
and utilities of the platform (Cottrell and Koput, 1998). Second, they increase the value of a 
platform to potential adopters by allowing them to exploit its features more fully (McIntyre and 
Subramaniam 2009). The translation add-on of Mozilla Firefox, for example, enhances users’ 
ability to surf the web via access to more information in foreign languages. Third, add-ons 
                                                          
2 https://clarity.fm/questions/270/answers/354/share 
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increase the confidence among potential adopters that a platform will not disappear in the short 
term (Adner and Kapoor, 2010). Thus, we conclude: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): As the number of the OSS complements increases, the potential size 
of the OSS platform community also increases. 
Release Strategy 
OSS developers issue more frequent software releases than developers of proprietary 
software (Bonaccorsi and Rossi 2003, Feller and Fitzgerald). A faster release frequency may 
attract more community contributions (e.g., bug fixes), which then help to improve software 
quality. A faster release would also reward contributors if it shortens the time it takes to accept 
their product suggestions (Raymond 1999). Lastly, a quick lease can signal the energy and 
momentum of an OSS project, and this often give users more confidence to adopt new software. 
Thus, we hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): As an OSS platform or its developers release new versions, adoptions 
of the OSS complements increase. 
Effects of End-User’s Generated Contents 
As mentioned earlier, OSS end-users generate online word of mouth (WOM), and 
observational learning signals. Online WOM may include 1) the valence and variance of product 
ratings; and 2) observational learning the number of daily users of the add-on. These two signals 
indicate the direct network effects of the community’s opinions and actions (respectively) on 
add-on adoption. That is, the valence gives adopters efficient access to opinions of the OSS 
community (Henning-Thurau and Gwinner 2004); so more positive valences should spur 
adoption (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006). Conversely, the variance of the ratings reflects the 
community’s valuation uncertainty (Sun 2012). Nevertheless, although a consumer may avoid 
adopting proprietary software with high valuation uncertainty, a risk-averse user may still decide 
to adopt an OSS complement because the expected benefit of free software may outweigh the 
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expected loss of (say) a malicious Trojan (Golden 2005). Indeed, because  OSS add-ons are free, 
a user might embrace the potential uncertainty of finding useful software, without paying for it 
(Martin et al 2007; Water 2012).  Furthermore, a large number of users of the complement may 
signal its value to potential adopters, who in turn may put different weights on online ratings and 
observational learning. As a result, studies tend to separate the effects of observational learning 
from those of online WOM; for the former induces herding behavior (Chen et al. 2011); but the 
later signals to potential adopters the complement’s the lower cognitive cost of use and user 
friendliness.  Thus, we hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 5a (H5a): As the rating valence and dispersion of an OSS complement 
increase, the adopters of the OSS complement increase. 
Hypothesis 5b (H5b): As the numbers of the daily users of an OSS complement increase, 
the adopters of the OSS complement increase. 
MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
Our main task is to quantify the factors that can influence the interdependent diffusion of 
an open platform and its many add-ons. As a result, we build upon the basic Bass diffusion 
model, BDM (Bass 1969), given its parsimony and the intuitive interpretations of its parameters 
(Hauser et al. 2006). Specifically, we adopt the BDM to build system of differential equations, 
subsequently expressed in state space form. Thus, the first equation of the system models 
diffusion of the platform, and the others the diffusion of its add-ons. Our model has several 
notable features. For example, we allow diffusion to be latent, random processes; which in turn 
give us the flexibility to model adoption patterns beyond the ones underlying the mixed effects, 
or basic diffusion model (Goswami 2001). Similarly, we link diffusion parameters to online 
ratings and observational learning from daily use; these variable vary across product and time; 
and so in this way we account for adoption heterogeneity (Dellarocas et al. 2007). In addition to 
testing the above hypotheses, H1-H5, the model captures the role of developer incentives and 
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license types; as well as controls for churn across add-ons. We model churn or dis-adoption 
because OSS complements are free but often non-unique; and consequently consumers may find 
them simultaneously easy to adopt and dis-adopt. Similarly, because only platform users can 
adopt a complement, we allow the market size of the complement to be some proportion of 
platform adopters, as adoption evolves over time. This proportion, our “relevance” parameter, 
should reflect the fact OSS complements often have narrow market appeal.  
Diffusion of OSS Platform 
We begin with a diffusion model for the platform that reflects the indirect externality of 
its complements (e.g., Gupta et al. 1999), as well as other external forces that can influence its 
adoption. Formally, we let tm  denote the latent cumulative number of adopters of the platform 
at time t, where M is the market potential; and p and q the external and internal market forces’ 
parameters, elsewhere termed innovation and contagion, respectively. Thus the diffusion, 
differential equation of the platform has the form:  
1)              TtmM
M
m
qp
dt
dm
tt
t
t
t
t ,,,,,1 ),)((     
To model the influence of competition (H1) and governance (H2) on the platform’s diffusion, we 
adopt the method proposed in Horskey and Simon (1983), modeling the external force parameter 
 as the time-varying function: 
2)     ρZβX ttt pp  0    
where  denotes the unobserved factors; tX is a vector of daily usage of Chrome and Internet 
Explorer; tZ  is a vector of developer nominations and the review committee (AMO) ’s 
performance; β  and ρ  are vectors of parameters to be estimated. We include Chrome and 
tp
0p
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Internet Explorer as competitors of Firefox, based upon media evidence of the close competition 
among these three (two open source and one proprietary) browsers. 
In addition, we quantify indirect externality (H3) by allowing the market potential of the 
platform to vary with the number of complements that OSS community creates on the platform 
(Gupta et al. 1999; Stremersch et al. 2007). In other words, new complements may attract new 
platform adopters by (for example) uncovering regions of unmet consumer needs. Formally, we 
let the platforms’ market size evolves with following process: 
3)     
where  then denotes the unexplained market potential;  the accumulative number of add-
ons up to time t; and  a parameter to be estimated. Thus, our platform model (equation 1) 
explicitly captures forces consistent with indirect network externality (equation 3), and those 
with direct network externality, as implied by the adoption ratio, tt Mqm /  (Bass 1969). 
 Diffusion of OSS Complements 
Given the platform specification, we now describe the interrelated diffusion of its 
complements, again using the BDM framework. The novelty here is that we endogenize the 
market potential of the complements and control for their dis-adoption. Formally, we let jtn
denote the latent cumulative number of adopters of the OSS complement j at time t; then 
diffusion of each complement becomes: 
4)  JjjTttjttj
tj
jt
jjtjt
jt nnm
m
n
qp
dt
dn
,..,1,,,,1  ,))()1((  

   
where tm represents the latent cumulative number of platform adopters at time t; jtp and jtq  the 
external and internal diffusion parameters;  10 ,j  the OSS complement’s relevance 
tt AMM  0
0M tA

15 
 
parameter; and  10,j   the dis-adoption rate. That is, we use the method outlined in Libai et al. 
(2009) to model churn, assuming that the fraction that dis-adopts, j  does not spread word of 
mouth for the software. We think dis-adoption is a relevant feature here, given the low-costs and 
often non-uniqueness of OSS complements, and their analogy to services, which users can and 
often choose to dis-adopt (Keck 2015). Also, because many OSS complements cannot be used 
without adopting an OSS platform (e.g., Firefox add-ons) and add-ons tend to be narrowly 
defined, we restrict the relevance parameter, j  to the interval  10, .  
 To study the effects of a quick release strategy on OSS (H4) complement diffusion, we 
model external or innovative factor of each complement as the time-varying function: 
5)      
where jp0  denotes the unobservable component; and  the new releases of the platform 
and complements, and their parameters and , respectively. To preserve a smoothed effect 
of new software release as suggested in Wiggins et al. (2009), and consistent with consumer 
procrastination theory, we smooth the new releases dummy as follows:   
6)     
where   is the last version release time,  and the decay factor. We set  to 0.89 the estimated 
decay factor of a discrete time analog model of Nerlove and Arrow (1962). We follow the same 
procedure to create jtPV . Later we consider the potential endogeneity of these variables, and 
robustness of the smoothing procedure used to create them (See Web Appendix A). 
     Next we investigate the role of quality signals (H5) generated from the user community 
by modeling the imitation (WOM) factor as the function: 
jtp
jtjjtjjjt AVpPVppp 210 
jtPV jtAV
jp1 jp2
  tjtAV
jtq
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7)    
with unobserved component , and consumer learning signals -- the variance of the 
complements’ ratings ; the average ratings ; and the observational learning from 
the daily usage  , with parameters , and , respectively. Here observational 
learning,  is the fraction of the daily users of an OSS complement j obtained from the total 
number of daily users of add-ons in j’s category (see equation 8); that is, we assume consumers 
not only care about absolute add-on usage numbers; but consistent with prospect theory, we also 
assume they compare the daily use of similar add-ons within a category (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979).   
8)     

cj jt
jt
jt Usage
Usage
OL        
Finally, to explain heterogeneity in the parameters of our joint diffusion model, we use a 
vector of license and potential business model information of each OSS complement. This vector 
includes a dummy variable for whether the add-on has the options of “ask for money 
contribution” or “meet the developer”, and whether its license is one of the following types: 
“Fully Free”, “Restricted”, or “Mozilla”. Formally, we define the vector of parameters as 
),,,,,,,,( 3210210 jjjjjjjjjj qqqqppp . The hierarchical model explains this vector of 
parameters as follows based upon the vector of business model and license dummy variables jD : 
9)    jjj D         
  Figure 2 gives a conceptual description of our model. 
    -- Insert Figure 2 here – 
jtjjtjjtjjjt STAVGqOLqRTVqqq 3210 
jq0
jtRTV jtSTAVG
jtOL jq1 jq2 jq3
jtOL
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Thus, system of equations 1-4 is a flexible specification that reflects some key features of 
platform-complement diffusion. First, it captures the indirect network effect of complements on 
platform adoption, allowing complements to expand the potential number of platform adopters.  
Second, the market potential of the complement is proportional to the number of platform 
adopters; third, it allows for complement dis-adoption, a likely scenario for OSS complements; 
fourth, it captures the indirect network effect through online WOM and user activity; and finally, 
it allows time varying parameters in the bass model, which then makes it simple to test features 
of open source innovation.    
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
So far we have presented a theoretical model of diffusion. To address our substantive 
questions (H1-H5), we will have to recast the model to an empirical form, address identification 
concerns, and present an estimation procedure to recover model parameters. First, however, let 
us consider the data available to help identify these parameters. 
   Data Description 
   Our main data is an unbalanced panel of daily downloads of 52 Firefox Add-ons -- free-
software that extends the Mozilla browser to include features such as games and entertainment, 
privacy and security, language support, and web development tools. Tables 1-2 define the 
relevant model variables, and tables 3-6 present basic statistics for them. First, we obtained 
information about the daily cumulative number of Add-ons from Mozilla’s website; and daily 
usage data for Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome and Microsoft (MS) Internet Explorer (IE) 
browsers for 1686 days, from 2008 to 2013; with Firefox Add-ons launched at the different 
points during the period. We approximated the daily users of each web browser (i.e. Mozilla 
Firefox, Google Chrome and Microsoft Internet Explorer) by multiplying their daily market 
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shares by the monthly number of computer hosts. Observing a linear pattern of growth in the 
internet hosts, we interleaved the daily number of hosts, as the demand or supply of personal 
computers is mature and hence stable.  
-- Insert Tables 1-2 here – 
-- Insert Tables 3-6 here -- 
We also obtained data on add-on/platform releases, developer reward incentives, add-on 
license types, and OSS governance. We smoothed the OSS new release variables using the 
procedure outlined earlier. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the smoothed new release measures 
for a sample of four add-ons. For incentives measures, we extracted data from the main page of 
each add-on that indicates whether its developer preferred to solicit money from or to meet end-
users. In addition, Mozilla Firefox uses various licenses to protect the intellectual property of 
their developers (See Tables 2 and 3); thus we extracted licenses data for each add-on. Finally, to 
publish on the Mozilla Platform’s website an add-on should pass the filter of the Add-on Mozilla 
Organization review (AMO) committee, a self-organized team of the experienced add-on 
developers who review add-ons or new releases submitted by fellow developers. We mined the 
monthly performance data (from Mozilla’s website) of this review committee.  
-- Insert Figure 3 here -- 
There are 19,211 online ratings in our sample (of 52 add-ons) in the period of the study. 
We used historical ratings data to build rating valences and rating variances, using the same 
process Mozilla Firefox uses to generate them for its OSS community. Observation learning 
comes from the visible, daily users of the add-on; on average 0.9M OSS community members 
use add-ons, with a variance of 2M. Lastly, we transformed several variables to avoid 
multicollinearity and thus improve our computations. That is, we rescaled and demeaned: AMO 
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review committee’s performance; the daily usage of the Chrome and the IE; rescaled the daily 
use of the Firefox and the cumulative daily downloads of the Firefox Add-ons; and demeaned 
product ratings mean and variance; observational learning from daily users(after same scaling);  
and the smoothed new releases’ data.  
Empirical Model  
Admittedly, the diffusion processes and the data described earlier could be prone to 
process and measurement errors, in other words, a form of unobserved temporal heterogeneity. 
Thus first we assume the platform and complement diffusions to be latent, random processes; 
and consequently augment the differential equations 1-4, for tm
 
and jtn with additive random, 
normal errors; that is, equations 1-4 now become differential equations for the means of the 
platform and complement diffusion processes. As mentioned earlier, treating the diffusion 
processes (and its parameters) as random, give us the flexibility to model other growth patterns 
beyond the standard s-shaped pattern (Karmeshu and Goswami 2001). We should also discretize 
these differential equations to obtain a model in state-space form (equations 11 and 10). This 
discrete form has several immediate advantages: it obviates the need to solve a large, intractable 
system of non-linear of differential equations (1 platform + 52 add-ons);  and so is convenient for 
handling multivariate data (i.e., many complements) and the nonlinear dynamics embedded in 
the diffusion process  (see, for example, Durbin and Koopman 2001, pp. 51–53). Secondly, we 
assume  the observed cumulative number of adopters of the OSS platform, and  those for 
the complement j at time t are functions of the latent adopters tm
 
and jtn (respectively); and zero 
mean, normally distributed errors, t
 
and jt .  So our resulting empirical model becomes: 
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with zero mean normal errors t   and  orthogonal to t
 
and jt .   
Identification and Endogeneity 
Before reviewing the estimation method we need to address potential endogeneity and 
identification concerns. For example, AMO performances and OSS release frequency are two 
potential sources of endogeneity.  The release frequency may correlate with OSS adoption costs 
because adoption costs, which we do not observe, can spur OSS diffusion. Similarly, AMO 
performance can be higher due to higher levels of developer and end-user participation; and 
community participation could influence OSS project success (Grewal et al. 2006; Lerner et al. 
2006).  Thus, we test for endogeneity, employing a latent instrumental variable (LIV) approach 
(e.g., Naik and Tsai 2000; Rutz et. al 2010), but found no evidence of such in our sample to bias 
estimates of these two variables (See Web Appendix A).  
Also our long time series and the variations across Firefox’s add-ons allow us to identify 
the diffusion parameters. Moreover, our daily data should mitigate potential interval bias 
attributed to discrete-time bass diffusion models (Xie et al. 1997); for Putsis and Srinivasan 
(1999) report less severe interval bias when studies use monthly rather than the annual data.  
Lastly, the MCMC estimation employed, not only eases dealing with unbalanced nature of our 
data, but also allows us to characterize the inherent uncertainty in the diffusion parameters (Lenk 
and Rao1990; and Putsis and Srinivasan 1999).  
 
jtjtjt ny 
jt
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Model Estimation  
The resulting response model (8-11) is dynamic and nonlinear in the state parameters, jtn  
and tm ; thus we require methods appropriate to estimate their densities. Traditional methods 
such as OLS and MLE cannot handle non-linear dynamics and heterogeneity well, and non-
linear least square (NLLS) requires analytic solutions.  Thus, we thus adopt a Bayesian 
Sequential Monte-Carlo (SMC) approach given the flexibility of these algorithms for estimating 
non-linear, dynamic systems.  Moreover, given the above discrete model and the normal 
assumptions, two SMC algorithms emerge: the Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) and the 
Unscented Kalman Filters (UKF), both methods work with linear-normal approximations. But 
the EKF would approximate the non-linear platform and add-on diffusion equation (10-11), 
while the UKF instead approximates the posteriors of the state variables by sets of sample points 
(Ristic et al. 2004). Thus, for highly nonlinear Gaussian systems the UKF produces typically 
better results, but our diffusion model is quadratic and so we adopt the EKF-MCMC, our 
Markov Chain Monte-Carlo approach to the EKF, which subsequently performs well. Also, in 
our application the EKF is more computationally efficient given the sizeable dimension of our 
state space (52 add-ons) and the maximum length our time-series (T=1686).   
Extended Kalman Filtering and MCMC (EKF-MCMC) Algorithm 
Our estimation task then is to recover the following components for the platform and 
each of its complements j: time-varying (state space) components  TttT mm 0:0  and
  jT
tjtTj
nn
0:0, 
 ; regression components for H1-H5,   ,,,,0 Mpp Ω  and
    3
0
2
0 

iijiijj
qpΩ ; and variance components,  ),(,, pjiii WV   ; all defined in equations 1-11. 
An EKF-MCMC strategy would thus seek to simulate the joint posterior of all parameters, given 
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platform  pTppTp yyyy ,.., 21:1,   and complement   JjjTjjTj jj yyyy ,,,121:1, ,,..,   adoption 
observations. It can accomplish this by indirectly sampling iteratively from a sequence of 
conditional posteriors:    TppppppTpT mWVpWVymp :0:1,:0 ,,,,, ΩΩ    and    TijjjjjjTjTi nWVpWVynp :0,:1,:0, ,,,,, ΩΩ  . 
Notably, conditional on the time varying parameters Tm :0 and Tjn :0, one can sample the regression 
and variance components using standard MCMC ideas (See Rossi et al. 2005). The conditional 
posteriors,  ..:0 Tmp  and  ...:0, Tinp , however, are unavailable analytically since the BDMs are 
nonlinear in their respective time-varying parameters; hence the standard Kalman filter algorithm 
does not apply. We thus apply the Extended Kalman Filter, an approximate filtering approach 
based on the Taylor series expansion of the non-linear bass equations.  For example, for the 
platform model the approximation gives: 
11)      tttttt amJagm   )()( 111  
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1
)(
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





tam
t m
mgJ are evaluated at mean )( 111   ttt DmEa  .  We linearize the diffusion model 
for each complement in a similar way. With this linearization, we can sample  ..:0 Tmp  and
 ...:0, Tinp  using the standard FFBS algorithm (Fruhwirth-Schnatter, 1994; Bass et al. 2007).  
ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Tables 7-11 and figures 4-6 summarize the main findings of our study, which includes 
the evaluations of a) hypotheses H1-H5; and b) the robustness and fit of the proposed model. 
First, table 7 compares the performance of our proposed model against those of nine alternatives 
in terms deviance information criteria (DIC). Notably, the proposed model outperforms all 
23 
 
alternatives in terms of DIC, a suitable criterion for hierarchical model selection (Spiegelhalter et 
al. 2002). Similarly, Figures 4 and 5 reports the 1-step-ahead forecast the Firefox platform and 
four of its complements; all track the data with some precision as shown in the mean absolute 
deviation (MAD) and mean squared error (MSE) scores in Table 8. Thus these fit and forecast 
measures point to the ability of our proposed model to capture the underlying diffusion process.  
Table 9 reports estimates for the Firefox platform diffusion model.  First, the effects of 
both open
 1
 and proprietary browsers 2 , Microsoft IE and Google Chrome (respectively), on 
the diffusion of Firefox are negative and significant (H1). This is consistent with media 
conjecture that both types (OSS and proprietary platforms) compete for end-users (e.g., in the so-
called “Browser Wars,” See Bott 2014); but still mildly surprising given that we could easily 
imagine OSS end-users choosing both Chrome Firefox.  With regard to platform governance, we 
find the effect of the AMO review process to be positive and significant (H2), which again 
suggest the importance of the OSS community, and its self-governance to platform success. We 
will return to this issue later. Finally, the effect of the cumulative number of add-ons on the 
marketing potential of the Mozilla platform  is positive and significant (H3); this suggests one 
mechanism for the effect of indirect network externality on an OSS platform, and underscores 
the importance of add-ons to platform diffusion. This finding is even more interesting because 
the direct network effect parameter 0q  is insignificant, which implies that the appeal of Firefox 
has more to do with the availability of it complements. 
Table 10 shows estimates for the OSS add-on diffusion models. The effects of new 
releases (add-ons 1p  and platform 2p ) have positive and significant effects on the diffusion of 
the Firefox’s add-ons. This seems consistent with a basic but largely untested tenet of OSS 
ideology (Raymond 1999), that releasing early and frequently help speeds OSS project success 
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and now diffusion (H4); a prescription that runs counter to proprietary software development 
practices. The effects of quality signals -- rating valence, rating variance (H5a) and observational 
learning (H5b) -- on OSS complement diffusion are all positive and significant. Marketing 
studies on proprietary goods have found similar results for the effects of rating valence 
(Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006) and observational learning (Chen et al. 2011) on product 
performance. Our finding of a positive effect of rating variance for OSS (non-monetized 
software) diffusion stands in contrast to those of Sun (2012), who found a negative effect for the 
proprietary goods.  Note that both Martin et al. 2007 and Clemons et al. 2006 found a similar 
positive effect of dispersion on the performances of movie and beer brands, which suggests  that 
consumer behaviors in these two categories may share some similarity with those in a OSS 
community. Nevertheless, the founding advocate of free software, Richard Stallman once said in 
reference to OSS: “This is a matter of freedom, not price, so think of “free speech,” not “free 
beer.”3 We thus surmise that our finding of a positive impact of variance on OSS diffusion 
maybe be attributed more to the joy of experiencing freedom, and less to the joy of surprise. 
Finally, Table 10 reports small, positive estimates of churn j  and the relevance j  parameter. 
The histogram in figure 6 shows a left skewed distribution for the relevance parameters, which 
suggests that in an OSS context an innovation does not have to be highly relevant to obtain large 
numbers of potential adopters; so the OSS ecosystem allows people with heterogeneous 
preferences to co-exist. We find also that the daily churn of the OSS complements are on average 
1.74%, which is closer to monthly estimates for online brokerage, books, and satellite radio in 
Libai et al. 2009 than to the yearly estimates for cellular phones.  
                                                          
3 http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/open-source-misses-the-point.html 
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Lastly, table 11 shows estimates that attempt to explain heterogeneity in add-on 
parameters as a function of license types, and OSS developer incentives. Notably, we find no 
significant effects of license or incentive types on add-on diffusion, though studies suggest these 
could affect the success of OSS innovation (Lerner and Tirole 2002). Yet our null findings in the 
case of Mozilla may still be reasonable. For example, at this point in our sample, Mozilla is a 
successful and stable OSS platform, and so these seemingly extrinsic incentives may not 
influence the level and quality of developer participation or signal OSS add-on quality to end 
users.  Moreover, many software complements rarely have economic value to developers, who 
would freely contribute them to the platform without the need to protect their intellectual 
property, and so here licenses restrictiveness becomes less relevant. For these reasons, we are not 
entirely surprised by these findings. 
AMO EDITORIAL EFFORT REALLOCATION 
We have seen that OSS governance, the AMO editor contributions, can improve platform 
success (H2). As a result, though Mozilla may not have direct control of the third-party AMO; 
Mozilla could be tempted to use soft power to organize events4 or hire temporary staff to 
influence the pace of the editorial process, to the satisfaction of the add-on developer 
community. We consider the result of one such scenario. That is, we consider whether Mozilla 
could have allocated the editorial effort differently to increase platform diffusion; and then 
compare the features of the actual AMO effort to one that Mozilla would have implemented. For 
this scenario, we assume the AMO’s total effort is fixed, and that Mozilla internalizes the 
editorial process in order to maximize the diffusion of Firefox. Our model task then is to recover 
a best editorial committee effort over 1,424 days of the study.  
                                                          
4 https://blog.mozilla.org/addons/2009/06/29/amo-review-queue-burndown-a-huge-success/ 
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For this purpose we solve a large scale non-linear problem to find the optimal daily 
editorial effort of AMO editors. The problem can be conceived as finding a sequence of the 
proposed contributions  Tttpc 1}{   that create the largest total cumulative diffusion.  That is, we 
have: 
P1)    
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where ]|[ 1tt DyE  is the daily 1-step ahead diffusion forecast and AMOB  the current total 
contribution of the Firefox AMO editors. At each month Mozilla Firefox decides on the level of 
contribution; hence, there are TK  effort levels, where K denotes the sum of actual AMO 
observed effort over the T days of the planning horizon. The solution to this problem involves 
searching over a set of admissible effort sequences of Tttpc 1}{  to find a sequence that yields the 
largest level of the expected total diffusion, given the estimated non-state parameter values for 
the dynamic model. The total expected diffusion is based on the information available at the 
beginning of the planning stage, so we use an Extended Kalman Filter (forward filtering step), 
given the non-state parameter estimates to maximize the cumulative one-step ahead forecast of 
the diffusion path .}ˆ{ 1TttY   Now because finding the optimal solution requires exponential time 
order processing, we use the genetic algorithm (GA) available in MATLAB.  Recall, the GA 
starts with a random candidate population; and through the processes of selection, cross over and 
mutation, it produces better off-springs (schedules) in subsequent generations and converges on a 
set that is most likely to contain the optimal schedule.  
Table 12 reports the actual next to the optimal or model-based AMO contributions 
obtained from our solution to P1. These model-based contributions would generate an additional 
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15 million users of the Mozilla platform. Moreover, the solution provides two intuitive results. 
First, simple calculations show that the cumulative contributions over time derived from P1 are 
higher in nearly all cases; and second, the contributions are more stable than the actual 
contributions (Standard deviation: 252.98 vs 441.56). That means Mozilla could have probably 
increased the diffusion of Firefox by increasing the pace but reducing the fluctuations (or 
variance) of its editorial response to nominations from the developer community. These specific 
actions seem consistent with case studies on Mozilla Firefox (Rao et al. 2009), which view the 
developer community as critical to Mozilla’s long-term success against Internet Explorer, (at the 
time) the default platform for many end-users.   
-- Insert Tables 12 here – 
CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS 
We study the interdependent diffusion of an open source software (OSS) platform and its 
software complements, new product diffusion in the absence of typical marketing incentives. 
Here an OSS platform is a type of distributed innovation in which an owner invites third-party 
collaborators to create add-ons/plug-ins that extend the features of the platform. Our goal was to 
quantify the effects of i) platform competition;  ii) add-on reviews or OSS governance; iii) 
network externality of complements; iv) frequent software releases; and v) online word of mouth 
and observational learning signals, all on OSS diffusion. 
To measure these effects we extend the Bass model (BDM) to allow for parameter 
dynamics, heterogeneity (e.g., p, q), endogeneity (e.g., market potential, M). We apply the 
extended model to a canonical example, the diffusion of the Mozilla Firefox browser and 52 of 
its add-ons. We re-cast the resulting 53 differential equations into non-linear, discrete-time, state-
space forms; and then estimate this interdependent system using an MCMC approach to the 
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Extended Kalman Filter (EKF), a Sequential Monte Carlo method that works with normal-linear 
approximations. Our EKF-MCMC algorithm is preferred here to other Gaussian filters such as 
the Unscented Kalman Filter (UKF) and  the Augmented Kalman Filter with continuous state 
space and discrete observations (AKF-CD) given the low order of our non-linearity but high 
dimensions of our state-space; the lengths of our sample (T=1686 days) and the importance of 
heterogeneity. Moreover our daily data mitigates potential interval bias attributed to discrete-
time bass diffusion models. 
We obtained several interesting results. First, results show the indirect network effects (of 
add-ons) on the platform to be positive and significant; but the direct network effects to be 
insignificant. Thus, OSS platforms should also encourage content creation (i.e., add-ons) rather 
than focus exclusively on generating platform awareness. Results also show that the add-on 
(editorial) review process can help spur platform diffusion. As a result, a platform could be 
tempted to internalize the editorial review process or use more soft power to influence it. In fact, 
our simulation showed that Mozilla could probably increase its diffusion by reducing the 
fluctuations of and speeding-up the AMO’s response to nominations from its developers. 
Similarly, ratings valence and variance, and observational learning all had positive effects on 
add-on diffusion. Platforms owner should therefore make these quality signals readily 
transparent because they help effect the match between the two sides of the platform, developers 
and end-users. 
Finally, some of our findings point to the delicate balance OSS platforms must maintain 
between i) the ideals of democratic participation (e.g., accepting add-ons without screening for 
market needs) (poetry); and ii) the practical task of creating competitive software (pragmatism). 
For example, we find that OSS platforms compete rather than complement each other and so 
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OSS platforms may need to consider marketing strategies to differentiate their products; ideas 
that traditionally motivate proprietary software teams; but could alienate OSS developers. 
Moreover, our findings of the positive influences of  the “release early and release often” concept 
of Raymond (1999) gives the OSS platforms a tool to increase societal welfare by providing 
more innovations faster, but also to compete with open or even proprietary systems. Yet we find 
that OSS license types and commercial incentives for developers had no effect on platforms 
performance; this means OSS platform could be more democratic (than proprietary) to allow 
individuals with broad types of incentives to participate in OSS innovation, given that they 
comply with OSS rules. 
Nevertheless, our work has several limitations that potentially could be addressed with 
the benefit of additional data. First, with individual level data on the activities of OSS members, 
we could better explain the macro level findings above. In this case our macro-level diffusion 
models would have to emerge from individual behaviors of and interactions among OSS 
adopters. Still, we would need to invent a fruitful way to incorporate micro level data into our 
mixed influence, aggregate diffusion models. Moreover, for an accurate forecast of the platform 
and complement adoption, the models would require data on all potential adopters. Second, our 
study lacks information on the software code or bug feedbacks from the AMO editors to the 
developers; having that data may give us some knowledge on the quality or effectiveness of the 
OSS developer community. It would also have been useful to model the diffusion of both OSS 
and proprietary platforms; so we could contrast the differences in factors that drive their 
diffusions.  Finally, even though our results are consistent with predictions, we obtained our 
results for an open browser platform (Firefox); and so it would be useful to extend our analysis 
to other forms of OSS platforms (e.g., OS). 
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Table 1: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS 
Variable Description 
Add-on Daily Download( jty ) The observed cumulative of number of users who downloaded an 
add-on in a given day. 
Mozilla Firefox daily Users 
( pty ) 
The daily number of users of Mozilla Firefox’s platform. We 
recovered this information by multiplying the daily Mozilla 
Firefox market share by the monthly number of internet hosts. 
Total number of add-ons created 
per day( tA ) 
The cumulative number of add-ons created by the community of 
developers from the inception of our data. 
Google Chrome daily Users 
 ( 1tZ ) 
The daily number of users of Chrome. We recovered this 
information by multiplying daily Google Chrome’s market share 
by the monthly total number of internet hosts. We use this 
variable to explain the external diffusion market force. 
Microsoft Internet Explorer (IE)  
daily Users ( 2tZ ) 
The daily number of users of Internet Explorer. We recovered this 
information by multiplying daily Microsoft Internet Explorer’s 
market share by monthly total number of internet hosts. We use 
this variable to explain the external diffusion market forces. 
New Version of add-on( jtAV ) An indicator variable that shows a new version is issued. We 
smooth it based on demand and release trend curve presented by 
Wiggins et al. (2009)5 and based on consumer procrastination 
theory with a 0.8 factor that is the decay parameter of our 
estimated Nerlov and Arrow model. 
  Ask for money contribution  
   ( 1tM ) 
An indicator variable. Some add-on pages suggest that if a user 
has enjoyed the add-on, they can help support the add-ons’ 
continued development by making a small money contribution 
with a click of a button. 
 Meet the developer option 
 ( 2iM ) 
An indicator variable. Some add-ons give users the option to meet 
the developer, to know why the add-on is created and what’s next 
for the add-on. By clicking on the link one can see the contact 
information of the developer and his/her profile. 
 Fully Free License ( 3iM ) This is an indicator variable specifying whether the license of an add-on is either BSD or MIT/X11 License. 
  Restricted Licenses ( 4iM ) This is an indicator variable specifying whether the license of an add-on is either GNU or Custom License. 
  Mozilla License ( 5iM ) This is an indicator variable specifying whether the license of an add-on is a Mozilla License. 
Total length of the monthly 
AMO nomination queue( 4tZ ) 
After nomination, the add-on status page will indicate the status 
of “In Sandbox: Public Nomination”. This means the add-on is in 
the nomination review queue6, the size of which we capture in 
this variable. 
Total number of monthly AMO In order for an add-on version to become public and readily 
                                                          
5 Wiggins, Andrea, James Howison, Kevin Crowston. "Heartbeat: measuring active user base and potential user 
interest in FLOSS projects." Open Source Ecosystems: Diverse Communities Interacting. Springer Berlin 
Heidelberg, 2009. 94-104. 
6 https://blog.mozilla.org/addons/2010/02/15/the-add-on-review-process-and-you/ 
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Editor’s contribution( 3tZ ) available to all, it needs to be submitted to a review committee (AMO). This process is called nomination7.  AMO engages in 
four types of activities:8 full review nominations, full review 
updates, preliminary reviews, and response to info request.  9 
Mozilla Firefox forum calls the sum of the number of responses 
of AMO to these incidences or nominations, total editor 
contributions, which we capture in this variable.10 
Add-on Daily Users( jtOL ) The daily users of add-on in the previous day, visible to 
consumers. 
Rating Valence Mean  
( jtSTAVG ) 
The discrete number of stars that show rate of the product out of 
5. We recovered this information from the historical data of 
rating, the same way Mozilla Firefox generates it. 
Rating Variance ( jtRTV ) The variance of distribution of product ratings. We recovered this 
from the historical data on distribution of product ratings. 
 
 
Table 2: LICENSE DESCRIPTION11 
Item BSD MIT/X11 Mozilla  GNU Custom 
Provides copyright protection TRUE TRUE TRUE  TRUE TRUE 
Can be used in commercial applications TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE  FALSE 
Bug fixes / extensions must be released to 
the public domain FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE 
Provides an explicit patent license FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE 
Can be used in proprietary (closed source) 
applications TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE 
 
Table 3: DESCRIPTIVESTATISTICS OF LICENSES AND INCENTIVES 
Item Type Frequency 
License Fully free (MIT/X11,BSD) 5 
 Restricted (GNU, Custom) 41 
 Mozilla 2 
Incentive Contribute 25 
 Meet Developer 10 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 https://blog.mozilla.org/addons/2010/02/15/the-add-on-review-process-and-you/ 
8 https://blog.mozilla.org/addons/2011/02/04/overview-amo-review-process/ 
9 When someone submits a new add-on, it will have to choose between 2 review tracks: Full Review and 
Preliminary review; the first one checks whether the add-on is safe to use, respects user’s privacy and choice, 
doesn’t conflict with other add-ons or break existing Firefox features, is easy to use, and is worth publishing to a 
general audience. The second one, only requires add-on to be safe to use. Add-on with preliminary review approval 
appear on the site as Experimental, cant’ be featured and get lower search ranking. If an add-on approved in the 
preliminary review track, it can be nominated to the Full Review track after a 10 day waiting period. 
10 https://forums.mozilla.org/addons/viewtopic.php?f=21&t=14313 
11 http://www.codeproject.com/info/Licenses.aspx 
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Table 4: ADD-ON BASIC STATISTICS 
Mean SD Min Max 
Daily Downloads (K) 7.64 18.50 11.79 283.44 
Daily Users (M) 0.88 1.95 1E-06 16.97 
Rating Valence Mean 4.28 0.50 1.00 5.00 
Rating Variance 1.46 0.76 0.48 4.20 
New Version of  add-on indicator 0.02 0.12 0.00 1.00 
Length of time series 1321.90 456.60 260.00 1686.00 
 
 
Table 5: PLATFORM BASIC STATISTICS 
 
Mean SD Min Max 
Mozilla Firefox daily Users (M) 229 16 185 262 
Total number of add-ons create per day 128 192 4 2,418 
Google Chrome daily Users (M) 189 119 20 432 
Microsoft Internet Explorer (IE) daily 
Users (M) 354 47 240 437 
Total number of monthly AMO Editor’s 
contribution 1,444 442 794 2,620 
Total length of the monthly AMO 
nomination queue 362 220 80 949 
 
 
Table 6: ADD-ON CATEGORIES BASIC STATISTICS  
Add-on Categories Representation in our sample 
Appearance 9 (17%) 
Bookmarks 3 (6%) 
Download Management 3 (6%) 
Photo and Multimedia 9 (17%) 
Game and Entertainment 3 (6%) 
Privacy and Security 6 (12%) 
Language Support 7 (13%) 
Alerts Updates 6 (12%) 
Web Development 13 (25%) 
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Table 7: MODEL COMPARISONS 
Model Description DIC Dp  )(LL  
1  No Churn  393,181,425 196,887,137 296,425 
2 No Version Carry Over  393,249,002 196,921,381 296,881 
3 No AMO effect on platform  393,258,460 196,926,790 297,560 
4 
Interaction model  
 ),,( jtjtjtjtjtjt STAVGRTVOLRTVAVPV   
393,224,624 196,921,662 309,350 
5  Unexplained internal market force of add-ons 393,183,354 196,889,620 297,942 
6 Unexplained external market force of add-ons 393,229,107 196,907,050 292,496 
7 Unexplained churn 393,265,094 196,298,559 297,309 
8 No cumulative effect of add-on creation on platform 393,220,649 196,903,764 293,439 
9 Unexplained relevance factor 393,338,158 196,971,387 302,309 
10  Proposed Model  393,029,826 196,694,177 179,264 
 
Table 8: PERFORMANCE OF THE PROPOSED MODEL FOR FOUR ADD-ONS AND PLATFORM 
Description MAD MSE 
Firefox Platform  1.20e-04 2.04e-05 
Auto-Pager Add-on  0.0016 4.71e-06 
Google Translator for Firefox Add-on  0.0012 3.34e-06 
Ad-block Plus Add-on 0.0049 3.97e-05 
Stealthy Add-on 0.0032 1.32e-05 
 
Table 9: PARAMETER ESTIMATES -- PLATFORM 
 Estimate Std. Dev. 2.5th 97.5th 
Market Size12:     
       Intercept of Market size 0M  1.54E-02 1.52E-06 1.54E-02 1.54E-02 
       Total Add-ons Created   3.60E-02 1.51E-06 3.60E-02 3.60E-02 
External Market Force:     
       Unobserved external Market Force 0p  1.76E-03 1.52E-06 1.76E-03 1.76E-03 
    Google Chrome competitor 1  -4.91E-05 1.51E-06 -5.17E-05 -4.73E-05 
    Microsoft Internet Explorer  competitor 2  -5.66E-04 1.52E-06 -5.68E-04 -5.64E-04 
    AMO Total number of contributions 3  3.42E-05 1.51E-06 3.16E-05 3.61E-05 
    AMO Length of  the Queue of nominations 4  3.52E-05 1.51E-06 3.26E-05 3.70E-05 
Internal Market Force:     
     Unobserved Internal Market Force 0q  1.27E-08 9.02E-09 -2.03E-09 2.77E-08 
Variances:     
    Observation Equation pv      1.44E-02 4.30E-03 8.52E-03 2.30E-02 
    State Equation pw  1.12E-01 8.35E-03 9.75E-02 1.25E-01 
                                                          
12 Market size is variable with time according to number of new add-ons  tt AMM  0
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Table 10: PARAMETER ESTIMATES – ADD-ONS  
 Estimate Std. Dev. 2.5th  97.5th   
       Relevance factor j  0.0142 0.0019 0.0104 0.0179 
       Churn factor j  0.0174 0.0021 0.0132 0.0215 
External Market Force:     
    Unobserved 0p  0.0087 0.0018 0.0051 0.0123 
    Add-on New Version 1p  0.0047 0.0011 0.0026 0.0067 
    Platform New Version 2p  0.0059 0.0012 0.0035 0.0083 
Internal Market Force:     
    Unobserved 0q  0.0057 0.0014 0.0030 0.0085 
    Rating Variance 1q  0.0131 0.0018 0.0096 0.0167 
    Observational Learning 2q  0.0054 0.0016 0.0022 0.0086 
    Rating valence mean 3q  0.0043 0.0014 0.0016 0.0070 
Variance:     
    Observation Equation jv  0.0002 1.56E-05 0.0002 0.0002 
    State Equation jw  0.0002 1.74E-05 0.0002 0.0003 
 
Table 11:  PARAMETER HETEROGENEITY 
   Estimate STD 2.5th  97.5th  
Relevance factor j  Intercept 0.014 0.007 0.002 0.026 
 Ask for money contribution 0.010 0.016 -0.017 0.038 
 Meet the developer option -0.003 0.020 -0.037 0.030 
 Fully Free License 0.001 0.034 -0.056 0.057 
 Restricted Licenses 0.006 0.027 -0.039 0.051 
 Mozilla License -0.001 0.046 -0.076 0.073 
Churn factor δ  Intercept 0.014 0.007 0.003 0.026 
 Ask for money contribution 0.010 0.016 -0.017 0.037 
 Meet the developer option -0.003 0.021 -0.037 0.032 
 Fully Free License 0.001 0.034 -0.055 0.056 
 Restricted Licenses 0.007 0.026 -0.037 0.051 
 Mozilla License 0.000 0.045 -0.073 0.073 
External Market Force      
     Unobserved 0p  Intercept 0.014 0.007 0.002 0.025 
 Ask for money contribution 0.011 0.016 -0.016 0.038 
 Meet the developer option -0.003 0.020 -0.036 0.031 
 Fully Free License 0.001 0.034 -0.055 0.056 
 Restricted Licenses 0.007 0.027 -0.036 0.051 
 Mozilla License -0.001 0.045 -0.075 0.072 
 Add-on New Version 1p  Intercept 0.009 0.007 -0.003 0.021 
 Ask for money contribution 0.000 0.017 -0.028 0.027 
 Meet the developer option 0.009 0.022 -0.027 0.045 
 Fully Free License -0.019 0.036 -0.077 0.039 
 Restricted Licenses -0.005 0.028 -0.051 0.041 
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 Mozilla License -0.013 0.047 -0.091 0.063 
     Platform New Version 2p  Intercept 0.005 0.007 -0.007 0.016 
 Ask for money contribution -0.001 0.017 -0.030 0.028 
 Meet the developer option 0.014 0.023 -0.023 0.051 
 Fully Free License -0.014 0.036 -0.074 0.045 
 Restricted Licenses -0.004 0.028 -0.050 0.043 
 Mozilla License 0.000 0.048 -0.080 0.078 
Internal Market Force      
     Unobserved 0q  Intercept 0.014 0.007 0.003 0.026 
 Fully Free License -0.001 0.034 -0.058 0.056 
 Restricted Licenses 0.006 0.027 -0.039 0.050 
 Mozilla License -0.002 0.045 -0.077 0.072 
 Ask for money contribution 0.000 0.029 -0.048 0.047 
 Meet the developer option -0.003 0.021 -0.037 0.032 
 Asked contribution amount 0.002 0.004 -0.004 0.007 
         Rating Variance 1q  Intercept 0.009 0.007 -0.004 0.021 
 Fully Free License -0.018 0.036 -0.076 0.040 
 Restricted Licenses -0.005 0.028 -0.051 0.042 
 Mozilla License -0.014 0.046 -0.091 0.062 
 Ask for money contribution 0.001 0.029 -0.048 0.049 
 Meet the developer option 0.009 0.022 -0.026 0.045 
 Asked contribution amount 0.000 0.004 -0.006 0.006 
    Observational Learning 2q  Intercept 0.005 0.007 -0.007 0.017 
 Fully Free License -0.015 0.037 -0.076 0.046 
 Restricted Licenses -0.004 0.029 -0.051 0.043 
 Mozilla License -0.003 0.048 -0.081 0.076 
 Ask for money contribution -0.003 0.029 -0.051 0.046 
 Meet the developer option 0.013 0.022 -0.024 0.049 
 Asked contribution amount 0.000 0.004 -0.006 0.006 
      Rating mean 3q  Intercept 0.006 0.007 -0.006 0.018 
 Fully Free License -0.010 0.036 -0.069 0.049 
 Restricted Licenses -0.003 0.029 -0.050 0.044 
 Mozilla License 0.021 0.048 -0.058 0.100 
 Ask for money contribution -0.001 0.029 -0.050 0.048 
 Meet the developer option 0.010 0.023 -0.028 0.048 
 Asked contribution amount 0.000 0.004 -0.006 0.006 
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Table 12: MONTHLY EDITORIAL EFFORT -- ACTUAL VS. MODEL-BASED 
Year Month Actual Contributions 
Model-Based 
Contributions 
2009 7 972 958 
2009 8 994 1526 
2009 9 1011 1642 
2009 10 1375 1380 
2009 11 794 1450 
2009 12 1673 1298 
2010 1 1402 1651 
2010 2 1537 1201 
2010 3 1159 1571 
2010 4 965 1508 
2010 5 903 1435 
2010 6 835 1409 
2010 7 1047 1540 
2010 8 923 1280 
2010 9 801 1332 
2010 10 1233 1554 
2010 11 841 1556 
2010 12 2416 1455 
2011 1 2620 1210 
2011 2 1776 956 
2011 3 1235 1718 
2011 4 1624 1668 
2011 5 2054 1523 
2011 6 1834 1203 
2011 7 1729 1704 
2011 8 1276 1439 
2011 9 1498 1594 
2011 10 1346 1479 
2011 11 1790 1432 
2011 12 2275 1837 
2012 1 2294 1345 
2012 2 1360 1285 
2012 3 951 1670 
2012 4 1359 1347 
2012 5 1261 1472 
2012 6 1409 1407 
2012 7 1391 1485 
2012 8 1222 1631 
2012 9 1805 1532 
2012 10 1316 1538 
2012 11 1720 1283 
2012 12 1412 1329 
2013 1 1651 1640 
2013 2 1723 1492 
2013 3 1470 1608 
2013 4 1351 1462 
2013 5 2093 1380 
2013 6 1283 210 
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Figure 1: Mozilla Community Structure 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Conceptual Model 
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Figure 3: Add-on Daily New Version Dynamic 
 
 
Figure 4: One-Step Ahead Forecast of Four Sample Add-on’s Cumulative Downloads 
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Figure 5: One-Step Ahead Forecast of Firefox Platform Daily Users 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Histogram of Parameter Estimate Across Add-ons 
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WEB APPENDIX A 
 
A Test for Endogeneity  
 
To test for the endogeneity we extend the method for linear models in Naik and Tsai 
2000 and Sonnier et al. 2012  to handle non-linear models. As discussed earlier, there is potential 
endogeneity in the variables: 1) Mozilla Add-on Organization (AMO) contributions, and 2) in 
the smoothed new release variables for Mozilla platform and its complements. We model 
endogeneity in the AMO contribution process in two ways. In the first, the AMO process (Z1) is 
a latent, first order AR(1) process with a drift and a stochastic error term. The second augments 
this AR(1) process with instruments Z2, the length of the AMO nomination queue; that is, 
exogenous queue length helps determine daily AMO contributions. The specification becomes:  
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where 1tZ  denotes the observed AMO contribution level, and t  the latent AMO contribution 
level, and 21 , are the parameters to estimate. Again, in the second approach we augment the 
(AR(1))  process, the state equation of the latent AMO contribution as follows: 
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We recast these models in state space form:  
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Our estimation occurs in two-steps. In the first, conditional on the latent AMO 
contribution t , and the error distribution ( ttw | ), we estimate tm  using an Extended Kalman 
Filter (EKF). Then in the second, conditional on tm , we use (E4) as the observation equation, 
(E5) as the state equation, and (E6) as the joint variance to estimate the latent AMO contribution 
t . The results of this estimation for both models are presented in the table 1A. The correlation 
and the off diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix are not significant; this suggests 
that endogeneity of AMO contributions are unlikely to be a problem. 
We use the same approach (E1) to test for the endogeneity of the smoothed new release 
variables for Mozilla platform and its complements. Table 1B presents the confidence intervals 
of these error correlations and variance-covariance matrix elements. Similarly, the correlation 
and the off diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix suggest that there is no 
significant endogeneity. 
 
References: 
Sonnier Garret P., Oliver Rutz and Leigh McAlister (2011), “A Dynamic Model of the Effect of  
  Online Communications on Firm Sales,” Marketing Science, 30(4), 702-716. 
Naik, Prasad A. and Chih-Ling Tsai (2000), “Controlling Measurement Errors in Models of 
Advertising Competition,” Journal of Marketing Research, 37 (1), 113-124. 
 
 
Table 1A: Potential endogeneity test for Mozilla Add-on Organizations Contributions 
Model Estimate Mean STD 2.5% 97.5% 
Model 1 Corr ),( ttw   0.0140 0.1260 -0.1980 0.2230 
 21  0.0005 0.0050 -0.0070 0.0080 
Model 2 Corr ),( ttw   -0.0020 0.1150 -0.1950 0.1930 
 21  -3.5e-5 0.0050 -0.0080 0.0080 
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Table 1B 
Potential endogeneity test for new releases of Mozilla platform and its Add-ons 
 
Corr 
),( 1ttw   Corr ),(
2
ttw   13  23  
Add-on 2.5% 97.5% 2.5% 97.5% 2.5% 97.5% 2.5% 97.5% 
1 -0.1012 0.0001 -0.1033 0.0139 -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000 
2 -0.0324 0.0320 -0.0332 0.0454 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 
3 -0.0951 0.0309 -0.0829 0.0623 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0001 
4 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0603 0.0216 -0.0437 0.0378 
5 -0.0738* -0.0024* -0.0172 0.0592 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0001 
6 -0.112* -0.001* -0.051 0.049 -8.e-5* -3.e-5* -0.0001 0.0001 
7 -0.038 0.042 -0.037 0.042 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 
8 -0.054 0.025 -0.024 0.063 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0001 
9 -0.023 0.037 -0.046 0.032 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 
10 -0.034 0.035 -0.042 0.042 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 
11 -0.063 0.028 -0.024 0.070 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0002 
12 -0.009 0.090 -0.059 0.034 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 
13 -0.060 0.041 -0.041 0.060 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 
14 -0.092 0.006 -0.025 0.067 -0.0004 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0002 
15 -0.041 0.034 -0.015 0.057 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0001 
16 -0.0888 0.0250 -0.0381 0.0690 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0002 
17 -0.0904 0.0387 -0.0360 0.0518 -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 
18 -0.0599 0.0423 -0.0690 0.0474 -0.0004 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0002 
19 -0.0865 0.0402 -0.0789 0.0490 -0.0005 0.0002 -0.0005 0.0002 
20 -0.0699 0.0325 -0.0435 0.0520 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 
21 -0.061 0.032 -0.040 0.055 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 
22 -0.074 0.024 -0.038 0.061 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 
23 -0.273* -0.115* -0.084 0.039 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0001 
24 -0.132* -0.010* -0.063 0.049 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0004 0.0002 
25 -0.097 0.017 -0.066 0.048 -0.0004 0.0001 -0.0004 0.0002 
26 -0.020 0.054 -0.016 0.057 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 
27 -0.094 0.049 -0.059 0.075 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0001 
28 -0.051 0.028 -0.014 0.075 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 
29 -0.081 0.017 -0.037 0.055 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0001 
30 -0.083 0.008 -0.026 0.074 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0001 
31 -0.060 0.024 -0.030 0.056 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0001 
32 -0.081 0.017 -0.060 0.023 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0000 
33 -0.010 0.047 -0.068 -0.007 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0000 
34 -0.118 0.082 -0.110 0.099 -0.0008 0.0004 -0.0008 0.0004 
35 -0.043 0.055 -0.058 0.049 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0001 
36 -0.081 0.045 -0.072 0.057 -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0001 
37 -0.047 0.037 -0.034 0.055 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 
38 -0.060 0.022 -0.005 0.077 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0001 
39 -0.043 0.037 -0.023 0.059 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0001 
40 -0.094 0.052 -0.087 0.060 -0.0006 0.0003 -0.0004 0.0002 
41 -0.069 0.015 -0.017 0.072 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0001 
42 -0.091 0.014 -0.049 0.061 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0001 
43 -0.063 0.116 -0.098 0.064 -0.0005 0.0005 -0.0005 0.0002 
44 -0.084 0.026 -0.061 0.028 -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 
45 -0.058 0.022 -0.035 0.047 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0001 
46 -0.037 0.044 -0.030 0.064 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 
47 -0.102 0.032 -0.073 0.049 -0.0005 0.0001 -0.0004 0.0002 
48 -0.062 0.037 -0.036 0.060 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 
49 -0.045 0.030 -0.012 0.072 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0001 
50 -0.075 0.026 -0.042 0.069 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0001 
51 -0.1052 0.0038 -0.0665 0.0390 -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0001 
52 -0.1080 0.0150 -0.0760 0.0453 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0004 0.0002 
1-Platform;  2-add-on 
 
